Lingnan University

Digital Commons @ Lingnan University
CAPS Working Paper Series

Centre for Asian Pacific Studies 亞洲太平洋研究
中心

10-2005

'Super paradox' or 'Leninist integration' : the politics of legislating
Article 23 of the Basic Law in post-handover Hong Kong
Yiu Chung WONG
Lingnan University, Hong Kong, wongyc@ln.edu.hk

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.ln.edu.hk/capswp
Part of the Political Science Commons, and the Public Affairs, Public Policy and Public Administration
Commons

Recommended Citation
Wong, Y.-c. (2005). 'Super paradox' or 'Leninist integration': The politics of legislating Article 23 of the
Basic Law in post-handover Hong Kong (CAPS Working Paper Series No.162). Retrieved from Lingnan
University website: http://commons.ln.edu.hk/capswp/55

This Paper Series is brought to you for free and open access by the Centre for Asian Pacific Studies 亞洲太平洋研
究中心 at Digital Commons @ Lingnan University. It has been accepted for inclusion in CAPS Working Paper Series
by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Lingnan University.

\.v
Working Paper Series
Cεn佐e

for Asian Pacific Studies

No. 162 (Oct 05) CAPS
'Super Paradox' or 已 Leninist Integration':
The Politics of Legislating Article 23 of the Basic Law
in Post-handover Hong Kong

Wong Yiu-chung

的

fpb
mm
Qu

J

11σb

L n mrH
a3
nn

加拉

7
l62

4~

‘ Super Paradox' or ‘ Leninist Integration' :
The Politics of Legislating Art icle 23 of the Basic Law
in Post-handover Hong Kong

Wong Yiu-chung

嶺南大學圖書館
一 7

MÁR 2006

Ll NGNAN UNIVERSITY L1 BRARY

October 2005

。

Wong

Yiu-chung

D r. Wong Yiu-chung is Associate Professor in Department of
Politics and Sociology, Lingnan University , Hong Kong.

Centre for Asian Pacific Studies
Lingnan University
Tuen Mun
Hong Kong
Tel: (852) 26167427
Fax: (852) 2465 5786
Email: caps@LN.edu.hk
http: //VV\\叫人 LN.edu . hkJcaps l

CAPS and CPPS Working Papers are circulated to invite discussion and
critical commen t. Opinions expressed in them are the author' s and
should not be taken as representing the opm lO ns of the Centres or
Lingnan University. These papers may be freely circulated but they are
not to be quoted without the written permission of the autho r. Please
address comments and suggestions to the autho r.

'Super Paradox' or 'Leninist Integration':
The Politics of Legislating Article 23 of
the Basic Law in Post-handover Hong Kong
Wong Yiu-chung
Abstract
Liao Zhengzhi,

的
t he 切
la
叫t仿
α
e

director of 的
the

Ofj
伊ìc
臼
e

of HOl啥
1哼
g Kong

αn
叫
dλMα cauJ

Aβρ
air.
爪戶

Hong Ko 咚 needed 仰
0 nl抄
ytωoc
彷
hα
仰
nge 的
thej
戶7α
句
gα
仰
ndB
品r吋吋社叫叫
削侃!活蚵忱
it瓦
ti臼
i.sh 伊
gOν
陀
er
仲n
間o
ωr aft仿
er the
While the press was full of doomsday prophecies about Hong
Kong s future , there was another camp of 'super-paradox' theorists who
genuinely believed that Hong Kong s status quo would not changed after
the Handove r, for an authoritarian one PQ1吵 -dominated PRC could
absorb a free- flowing Hong Kong without changing the nature of an
open society. Contrary to doomsday prophets and 'super-paradox'
theorists , this paper argues that, on the one hand, the doomsday prophecy
was groundless , but on the other han d, important institutioval changes
did take place even though bal叫y noticed. lt is argued, by using the
example ofthe legislation of Article 刃， that a gradual approach has been
adopted by the CCP to change the fundamentals of Hong Kong s polity,
a strategy that 1 call 'Leninist integration'
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Introduction
Hong Kong had been a British colony for 155 years before the
People's Republic of China (PRC) resumed its sovereignty over Hong
Kong on 1 July 1997.
Since then , more than eight years have passed and Hong Kong has
experienced momentous changes. In particular, the marching of half a
million people protesting against the legislation of the Art icle 23 of the
Basic Law on 1 July 2003 marked the turning point in the post-Handover
Hong Kong political development, which subsequently led to the

resignation of the Chief Executive (CE) Tung Chee-hwa. A
‘ super-paradox' theory, however, circulated after the Handover, which
basically argued that despite the sovereignty retrocession, nothing in
Hong Kong had changed and a free Hong Kong remained the same and
1
Beijing was content to leave Hong Kong alone. Nothing , however, was
further from the truth. In fact , the ‘ super-paradox' theorists were too
impatient and if only they could wait two or three years , they could have
seen that the ‘ paradox' had dissolved and Beijing's grip on Hong Kong
has been tightening as time goes by. The introduction of the
"accountability" system concentrated the power on the Chief Executive ,
abolishing the Chief Secretary as the head of the civil service and making
the post constitutionally redundan t.
ln April 2004 , Beijing's second interpretation of the Basic Law on
Hong Kong's political development intensified the trend. Beijing adopts
an incremental approach of what 1 call “ Leninist integration" , by which
a l1 authoritarian PRC could severely restrict the pace of democratization
and the civilliberties of Hong Kongers. In this paper, 1 would argue that
the legislation of the Article 23 in Hong Kong was , in fact , one of the
measures through which Beijing implements the tactics of “ Leninist
il1 tegration" and was the most dramatic step to change the nature of Hong
Kong as a free society by making use of the UK's law abiding tradition.
At the same time, 1 would also use the case to illustrate' the
post-Handover political development in Hong Kong in genera l.
The paper also attempts to analyze the origin of Arti c1 e 23 in the
Basic Law and the viewpoints of different social and political groups
pCliinent to the issue. Why are Hong Kong people so worried about
such legislation? 可That are the social and political forces that lend support
to the pro and con camps? What are the deep-seated reasons that
characterize such heated debates? The paper further examines the
impact that would be felt on Hong Kong SAR as an intemational city and
the consequences if the Article is enacted.
The Origin of Article 23
Hong Kong people were presented with the Hobsonian choice in the
matter of sovereignty change in 1997. The PRC refused to allow Hong
Kong to be involved in the negotiation with the British govemment. In
order to restore the confidence of local people and to honour its pledge
2

not to meddle with the intemal affairs of Hong Kong after the Handover,
the PRC drafted the te叮itory's mini-constitution-the Basic Law,
supposedly to embody the principle of ‘ one country, two systems' which
gives a high degree of autonomy to Hong Kong. The drafting ofthe Basic
Law lasted for five years and it was completed in 1990. The Law was
promulgated by the National People 's Congress (N PC) in April 1990 to
be effective after 1 July 1997. Among all the provisions in the Basic Law,
however, none is more controversial than Art icle 23. Despite Donald
Tsang , the new CE , having promised not to reintroduce legislation in his
remaining two- year term, even today, the society at large is still divided
over the content or substance of the Article , the pace of legislation or
even the necessity of legislating such a law.
The provls lO n of Article 23 in the Basic Law states simply that
“ The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall enact laws on its
own to prohibit any act of treason, secession, sedition, subversion against
the Central People 's Govemment , or theft of state secrets , to prohibit
foreign political organizations or bodies from conducting political
activities in the Region , and to prohibit political organizations or bodies
of the Region from establishing ties with foreign political organization or
bodies."
The A‘rticle had undergone several formulations before it took the
final shape. The June 4 massacre was the single most important event
impacting upon the drafting. The present form was introduced only in the
aftermath ofthe June 4 crackdown. As is well recorded , the issue ofHong
Kong sovereignty emerged in the late 1970s. From 1981 to 1983 the
British govemment and China negotiated an agreement supposedly to the
satisfaction of three sides. 2 The Sino-British Joint Declaration was
signed in 1984 and in 1985 , the PRC set up a Basic Law Drafting
Committee (BLDC) to dra 缸 the Basic Law and along the Dra丘 ing
Committee, a Basic Law Consultative Committee (BLCC), composed of
150 members , was set up to solicit ideas or opinion from Hong Kong
general public.
The 1980s was the most liberal era in China since the founding ofthe
PRC. Having discarded the shackles of Maoist dogma , Deng Xi aoping
became the de facto supreme Party/state leader and launched the four
modemization programs in the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) Congress in late 1978. His reform and open door
policies heralded a new epoch in China's developmen t. He was assisted

by tbe two reform-minded senior pa吐y leaders-Hu Yaobang and Zhao
Ziyang. 3 Deng also adopted a pragmatic pos仙re in foreign policy. The
astute and peaceful diplomatic solving of the sovereignty issue of Hong
Kong manifested a spirit of realism pervading tbe Basic Law.
1ncidentally, Cbina's intention of drafting a ‘ good' mini-constitution
for Hong Kong was evident from the start. For all its authoritarian
twists , the BLDC incorporated two most outspoken and articulate
democI前 s from Hong Kong , namely Martin Lee Cbu-ming , a
widely-beld as the fatber of democracy and Szeto Wah , a trade unionis t.
China nominated two-thirds of the members. One-third of its members
came from Hong Kong and most of them were political conservatives or
pro-Beijing establishment figures. A majority, therefore , was guaranteed
for tbe China status quo.
After three years of drafting , tbe BLDC published the first dra缸 of
Basic Law for consultation in April 1988. Tbe then subversion Arti c1 e 22
read as follows ,“Tbe Hong Kong SAR govemment shall prohibit by law
any act designed to undermine national unity or subvert the central
people's govemment." 1n retrospect, thougb ambiguous, the provision
was certainly much less harsb than tbe later versions. However, upon
being released, the article was heavily criticized by the legal community
and libera\-minded legislators. Most criticism stressed tbat the wording
was too vague and covered a variety of activities that were guaranteed by
tbe Sino-British Joint Declaration but would be considered illegal under
the Law. The criticism led to a totally reworded new Arti c1 e 23 in tbe
second draft of the Basic Law in February 1989. 1n the new dra缸， the
Article said that Hong Kong SAR “ sha11 enact laws on its own to prohibit
any act of treason, secession , sedition or theft of state secrets". The
offences were more precise and , in general , it was agreed tbat the notation
was consistent with Hong Kong common law tradition and, moreover, it
has the important words "on its own" which allows the Hong Kong SAR
to enact tbe law by itself after 1997 and seems to respect the autonomy of
Hong Kong
However, the events of June 4 1989 cbanged a11 tbese. The death of
former CCP general secretary Hu Yaobang on 15 April triggered tbe
largest social movement in several decades in the PR C. The pioneers
were the university students but the movement was participated in by a11
walks of life. For two months , thousands of pe
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‘ princelings' , and political reform. Deng Xi aoping responded with brutal
force. The armored cars and tanks rolled on the Chang An Avenue and the
demonstrations were crushed. The clock stopped clicking in Beijing and
the work of both BLDC and BLCC were suspended indefinitely.
In the months of April and May 1989 , when the pro-democracy
move l11 ent was at its height, Hong Kong people manifested unfailing
4
efforts in their support for the l11 0vemen t. In May, twice there were
more than one million people flooding on to the streets to show support
for the students and protest against the declaration of martial law in
Beijing by Li Peng , then Chinese premier. Unfortunate旬， the support
went afou l. After the massacre , more than three hundred thousand people
assembled in the Happy Valley horse race course to moum the thousands
ofvictims suppressed by the People's Liberation Army (PLA). Moreover,
hundreds of pro-democracy activists such as Chai Ling , Lee Lu , Feng
Cunde , Zhang Boli and Wuer Kaixi and including famous intellectuals
Yì n Jiaqi , Chen Yizi , Wan Runnan , Chen yi and Su Xi aokan in the
move l11 ent escaped to Westem countries through clandestine channels in
Hong Kong organized by the Hong Kopg Alliance in Support of the
Patriotic Democratic Movement in China and Hong Kong underground
societi es. 5
Hong Kong was publicly accused by Li Hou , then vice director ofthe
Office of Hong Kong and Macau Affairs , as being the biggest subveI討 ve
base against the PRC govemmen t. The relations between Hong Kong and
Beijing became extremely tense. A丘er the resumption of work , BLDC
reviewed the Basic Law provisions and Article 23 took its present form as
events unfolded. The wording of subversion against the central
govemment was inselied in the aftermath ofthe June 4 events , which was
in response to the subversive role of Hong Kong in the events. The final
version of the Basic Law was promulgated in April 1990.
Events Triggering the Legislation of the Article
In the first term (1 997-2002) of Tung Chee-hwa , Beijing adopted a
relatively non-interventionist posture towards Hong Kong , except the
NPC interpretation on the right of abode of the mainland- bom children
of Hong Kong residents in 1999. “ Public Order ordinance" and "Societies
ordinance" \vere passed after the Handover to deal with issues of social
order, demonstrations and relations between local political groups and

foreign political organizations , but not other more sensitive political
measures. However, there had been several incidents since the Handover
that put Hong Kong SAR govemment in an embarrassing position
because there is a lack of ordinances to deal with sensitive political issues
in Hong Kong in particular regarding national territorial integrity and
govemment confidential documents. Although the issues were resolved
by politica l/administrative measures permanent damage has been done for
Hong Kong and the image of mle of law was tamished. More importantly,
Beijing was determined that such emba叮assments would not happen
again and its move to push the Hong Kong SAR govemment to legislate
Article 23 was as urgent as ever when Tung's first term was approaching
its end.
The following incidents certainly forced the Tung
administration as well as Beijing to rethink the pace of the legislation of
the Article:
的

Cheng

An-kuo Incident

Cheng An-kuo was nomina lI y the general manger of the Chung Hwa
Travel Service but he was then, in fact, the de facto highest official of
Taiwan in Hong Kong. In July 1999, Lee Teng-hui, then Taiwan
president , talking to a German weekly joumalist, proposed a “ two state"
theory regarding international status of Taiwan , in which he rejected the
claims by the PRC that Taiwan is a local govemment while Beijing is the
central govemment; instead two political entities are of equal status.
Taiwan and the PRC are in a state-to-state relationship.
As expected , the theory was strongly attacked by the Beijing
media.On 17 July 1999 , Cheng An-kuo was invited to talk in a radio
program of RTHK , govemment-sponsored radio , called Hong Kong
Letter , in which he defended the "two states" theory. The ‘ letter'
engendered a strong reaction from the local pro-CCP groups. Ma Lik, a
NPC deputy and now chairman of the Democratic Alliance for the
Betterment of Hong Kong (DAB) 、 attacked Cheng 's speech on the radio
as disseminating the idea of Taiwanese independence , which has
secession intention and impac t. He urged the Hong Kong government to
draft Article 23 legislation as early as possible. On 19 August 1999 , then
vice premier Qian Qichen stepped in and stated publicly that Hong Kong
should not promote the ‘ two states' idea as it contravenes Beij in皂 ' s seven
principles which have governed the Hong Kong- Taiwan relationships
6

since 1997. 6 For the existing laws in Hong Kong simply cannot handle
the issues.
b)

Lu Hsin- Ii en Incident

Chen Shui-bian and Annette Lu Hsin-Lien were first elected Taiwan 's
president and vice- president in March 2000. A丘er the elections , the
Hong Kong Cable TV interviewed Lu on 29 March 2000 and the next day
it was broadcast for two days. In the interview, Annette Lu reiterated the
official position of the Democratic Progressive Party, which was that
Taiwan should have independence and the Taiwanese people did not want
to reunify with the Mainland.
Once again , Beijing reacted angrily and the People s Daily published
several articles condemning the views of Ann ette Lu. Locally; Wang
Fengchao , deputy director of Central Govemment Liaison Office ,
delivered a speech entitled “ The principle of one China and the Taiwan
issue" at a seminar organized by the Hong Kong Joumalist Association
on 12 April 2000 , with the senior management personnel of the mass
media as his audience.
At the outset , Wang excluded information about Taiwan reunification
from normal news items. He argued that the reunification with Taiwan is
an utterly important issue for the country and, therefore , it is the
responsibilities of Hong Kong reporters “ to uphold integrity and
sovereignty of the country and not to advocate the 'two states' theory.
This , according to his logic , has nothing to do with normal press
freedom. ,, 7 Wang hinted that the Article 23 on treason and subversion
should be enacted as quickly as possible.
In fact , there was a related incident conceming Annette Lu and
RTI-到丈 . So Wing-hong is a famous Hong Kong singer and he was found
taking drugs in a Taiwan karaoki and arrested. A缸er the trial he was
sentenced to twelve days of rehabilitation. He was found to have good
behavior and was released two days early. So far , everything was fine.
However, during his stay in the rehabilitation centre , An nette Lu came to
visit the center and they held a pa口y in which So was joyously singing
with Lu. This created a headline in Hong Kong as Lu was a political
figure. After So came back to Hong Kong , Che Suk-ml泣 ， a DJ in the
RTHK, wanted to arrange a dialogue between Lu and So on the radio.
The news immediately became a bomb shell in Hong Kong. The old

problem arose; should a govemment-sponsored radio interview (or let her
have a chance to talk) An nette Lu , who is the number two pro-Taiwan
independence figure? Should RTHK become a propaganda machine of
the govemment which is in conflict with the role long played by the
station? Henry Tang yi 月-yen ， then secretary responsible for
broadcasting policy, intervened and the dialogue was dead. 8
c)

Li Xiaomin Incident

Li Xiaomin is a Mainland Chinese scholar who has a Princeton Ph D
in sociology and is a naturalized American. He was teaching at the City
University of Hong Kong when he was arrested by the security forces in
Shenzhen on 25 February 200 l. He was sent to Beijing for trial and found
guilty of theft the of PRC govemment classified documents. Furthermore ,
he was alleged to have been spying for Taiwan. The PRC court
sentenced him to ten years of imprisonment but later deported him to the
USA because of American govemment intervention. The tricky point was
that, after several months, he was able to come back to Hong Kong and
resume his teaching duty at the City University.
Li 's retum to Hong Kong successfully aroused bitter debatesamong
pro-one- country and pro-two- systems camps in Hong Kong. The bone
of contention was about the extent of territorial jurisdiction of the
Mainland China court verdict. The pro-two-systems camp claimed it is
legitimate for him to come back because Hong Kong practiced ‘ one
country, two systems刊 and Hong Kong's legal system is different 仕om
that of the PRC; therefore , the mainland's legal jurisdiction did not cover
Hong Kong. However, the pro-one-country camp argued that Li should
have been barred , because the legal jurisdiction of the Mainland court
decision should be extended to Hong Kong since Hong Kong is a part of
the PR C. When Li was sentenced to imprisonment and later, deported
out of ‘ Chinese territories' , what does ‘ Chinese territories' mean? Does it
mean ‘ legal territories' by which Hong Kong has a distinctive system or
does it mean ‘ geographical te lT itories' in which Hong Kong is a pari of
the PRC. If it is the former , Li evidently could come back because his
verdict by Mainland court became invalid, and his conviction certainly
would affect his retum but if it is the latter, he would be sent into prison
once he set foot in Hong Kong.

On the surface , it seems that the pro-two-systems camp triumphed
and Beijing seems to have adopted a lenient approach in Li's case.
However, without the backing of the US govemment, Li's entry to Hong
Kong was doubtfu l. The incident evidently involved intemational
relationships , in particular Sino-American relation. The collision between
a Chinese jet fighter and an American surveillance plane over South
China Sea in April 2001 , which led to the death of a Chinese pilot and the
detention of twenty four US crew members and the plane in the PRC ,
produced a cold war between the PRC and USA. The crisis was solved
only by strenuous diplomatic efforts on both sides.
Then
Sino-American relationships began to warm up. It was at this time that
the spy case of Li Xi aomin occurred and it must be bom in mind that Li is
an American citizen and his retum was accompanied by a US Consular
officer at the airport. Li was detained for six hours in the airport. It was
most likely that, during the six hours , Beijing was consulted whether to
allow Li back to Hong Kong. ‘ One country' always predominates over
'two systems\Ma Lik once again raised in the mass media the issue of
legislating Article 23.
d)

Fa/un Gong Incident

Among these incidents , the Falun Gong movement in Hong Kong
was perhaps the most sensitive and complicated issue and caused
embarrassment both for Hong Kong SAR govemment and Beij ing.
Falun Gong was outlawed by the NPC after thousands of its followers
encircled Zhongnanh 剖， the nerve center of the CCP power, in 1999.
Since then , the Falun Gong movement has been brutally suppressed in
China and thousands of believers were jailed, as the CCP perceived the
movement as a threat to the regime. ln Hong Kong , Falun Gong was
registered as a social organization under the Society Ordinance in 1996
and their breathing practice was conducted publicly and peacefu Jl y. Even
a自 er its banning in Mainland , their activities were all within the confines
of Hong Kong laws and it would be illegitimate to outlaw the movemen t.
As an intemational city, Hong Kong is being closely watched by
intemational mass media. Even though Tung Chee-hwa gradually
moved from a neutral position to a position that pronounced that 'Falun
Gong is more or less an evil cul t' and then to a standpoint that firmly
declared Falun Gong is an evil cult in a span of two years from 2000 to
9

2002 , the Hong Kong SAR government could do nothing about it. That
could explain why the Beijing government was so pushy in urging Hong
Kong government to legislate Article 23.
The Views of Beijing
Since the inception of the second term of Tung Chee-hwa's
administration in July 2002 , the pressure on the HKSAR government to
enact the security laws had been mounting. There is no doubt that Beijing
wanted the SAR government to legislate as quickly as possible , as the
Central government cannot enact the law for the HK SAR. Their reason is
simple: because it is stated in the Basic Law that the SAR government
should enact locally laws regarding subversion, secession, and sedition. It
is against the constitution if the SAR government does no t. More
important紗， the first term of Tung (1 997-2002) had gone and the Taiwan
political scene was dominated by pro-independence figures. Li Teng-hui 's
pro-independence stand had become increasingly explici t. ln 2000 Chen
Shui-bian was elected as Taiwan's president.
On the tenth anniversary of the promulgation of the Basic Law in
2000 , Qian Xi aoyan , then vice-chairman of the Legislative A在alrs
Committee of the NPC , reiterated that the enactment of the article was
important because it involved sovereignty and the unification of the
nation. He was celiainly referring to Taiwan when he mentioned the issue
of unification. In a meeting between Qiao and Elsie Leung, Secretary of
Justice , in Beijing, Qiao emphatically said that “ Under the Basic Law, the
SAR has a duty and responsibility to enact the law.. ..it has to do it as
soon as possible. ,,9 On the same day, in a meeting with Elsie Leunιthe
then NPC chairman Li Peng publicly pushed Hong Kong for quickened
legislation. Elsie Leun 皂 repeated what Li had told her that the SAR has an
obligation to enact the law, though Li had not put any pressure on her to
speed up the process. 10 Later in an interview with Hong Kong television
broadcasting station TVB , Qian Qichen , the vice premier, explicitly
pointed out that the Falun Gong should be outlawed in Hong Kong if it
maintained ties with foreign groups after the enactment of the
anti-subversion law. 11
ln Hong Kong , before her resignation in April 2001 , Anson Chan ,
Chief Secretary for Administration, obviously did not think that the
legislation was urgen t. ln fact , she stated that the legislation of the Art icle
10

23 was of such a sensitive nature that the government should consult
widely before it made any decision. She argued that nothing can
chaIl enge the Basic Law and we should respect aIl aliicles in the Basic
Law including freedom of speech , press and etc , but we should not rush
to a decision. Elsie Leung said that the govemment would not make this
law rashly and it would consult wide sectors of society before the
enactmen t. To put down people 's worries , she added that by a Il owing the
enactment of this article locaIl y, the Central govemment, in fact,
understood that the degree of human rights and freedom in Hong Kong
and mainland China were different.
Moreover, to further aIl ay the fear of Hong Kongers , she pointed out
that according to Article 39 of the Basic Law, the provisions of the
lntemational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights as applied to Hong
Kong remained in force and therefore the rights of and freedom enjoyed
by Hong Kongers would not be restricted. She also pledged that she
would stand up to Beijing if it wants Hong Kong to pass laws on sedition
and subversion which would breach intemational safeguards on human
rights. She assured Hong Kong people that ‘ 'The purpose of the
legislation is not to target any particular group.... 1 don 't think there is
actua Il y a threa t. 1 believe the law is there in case there is a need to use
it.,, 12 FUlihermore , she added that if everyone is sincere in doing 泣， it
needed only a few years to complete the enactment, as most of the clauses
would be based on the existing ordinances. Lau Siu-k缸， the chief advisor
for Central Policy Unit , even went to predict that the legislation could be
completed within two or three years. 13 However, according to Zhang Xi n,
a noted Chinese legal specialist based in the Chinese University of Hong
Kong , the gap between Hong Kong 's conception of sedition and
subversion and China 's is so great that , it is difficult not to caπy
“ Chinese characteristics" ifthe Article were enacted. 14
The Consultative Process
FinaIIy, the Hong Kon 皂 SAR govemment published the consu Itation
document (hereafter the Document) on proposals to implement Article 23
of the Basic Law on 24 September 2002; the consultation period would
last for three months , with the aim of passing the Bi Il in July 2003. The
Document stated that the HKSAR govemment “ has both practical and
legal obligations to implement Article 23. . ..The inten t... is to prohibit by
11

law acts that would undermine the sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity
and national security of our country. " 的 In arguing for the introduction
of the proposal , Regina Ip said that " There are few people [in Hong
Kong] who are imbued with the concept of protecting one 's
country... .Security lies at the heart of our well-being. lt is the cornerstone
of the smooth running of our society." 16 The Document covers seven
areas of offences , including treason , secession, sedition , sedition,
subversion , theft of state secrets , foreign political organizations and the
17
police investigative powers. In fact , among the proposed offences ,
some were already dealt with under Hong Kong existing legislations. Part
1 and 11 of the Crimes Ordinance deal with treason and sedition
respectively. The Offzcial Secrets Ordinance deals with spying and
unlawful disclosure of the official confidential information. The Societies
Ordinance regulates , inter al悶， the activities of organizations and their
ties with foreign political organizations.
In the course of consultation, both the publicity style of senior
officials and the substances of the Document were heavily criticized by
society at large and the legal community in particular. Regina Ip Lau
Suk-y 白， the Security Secretary, who was responsible for marketing the
Document , was perceived to be too anogant and pushy and very often
discussion was impossible when she was present. After 1 July, she
resigned the post of the Security secretary. 18 At the end of the
consultation period, 100 ,909 submissions were received by the
government of which 97 ,097 were loca l. Without analyzing the
submissions properly, the government submitted the National Security
Bill (Legal form of Aliicle 23) to the Legislative Council (LegCo) for the
first reading on 26 February 2003.
Despite the concessions by the govemment , such as the relaxation of
the proscription mechanism and "a careful effort to strike a balance
between protecting national security and safeguarding fundamental ri ghts
and freedoms" , 19 the Security Bill stiU suffered a number of drawbacks
According to the Aliicle 23 Concem Group , whose membership consisted
of Audrey Eu , Alan Leong , Ronny Tong , Margaret N皂 ， all LegCo
members and lawyers and other legal professionals , the Bill contained a
number of major problems: 1) The proscription mechanism goes beyond
the requirements in Art icle 23 , and it threatens freedom
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because there is no public interest or prior publication defence;3) The
offence of sedition endangers freedom of speech because it is defined as
indictment to commit treason , subversion and succession, and incitement
can be committed by mere speech without any unlawful act; 4) The
wording in many parts of the Bill is too vague; 5)Apart from treason , all
Article 23 offences apply to all Hong Kong permanent residents wherever
their nationality and whatever they live and for what they do in or outside
Hong Kong;6) It abolishes important safe皂uards in the existing law that
prosecution of treason should be within 3 years and sedition within 6
months; 7)There is no reason to give the chief superintendent the power
to approve police break in , search and seizure of property, which is given
20
now by the cou此， etc.
As is well known , the CCP both represents and govems the country
in the PRC. The four cardinal principles are enshrined in the PRC
constitution , the most important of which is the rule of the CCP 21 • The
Party monopolizes political power, allowing no organized opposition , not
to mention popular elections in rotating the governmen t. An y criticism of
the govemment and the CCP even verbally could be construed as having
seditious intention to overthrow the state. This practically makes the CCP
immune from criticism and thus , freedom of speech is practically ruled
out from daily life and any activities on the part of citizens who are
perceived to be threat to the CCP Party!state could be liable for
prosecution under these provisions. Under the PRC's criminal law, it is
difficult to distinguish between sedition and exerclsmg genuine
rights!freedom of speech. Hong Kong public feared that by interpreting
the seditious offences to such an extent , the CCP could potentially
eliminate the fundamental rights pledged to HK citizens in the Basic Law.
As observed from Hong Kong , there were cases showing the arbitrary
application of criminal laws involving security issues in China. One
notable example is the case of Wang Dang , the number one hunted
student leader in the aftermath of June 4 events and now studying in
Harvard University. He was hunted down by the security forces and
imprisoned for four years. A 丘er his release , Wang stayed at home and
wrote articles in overseas publication criticizing the CCP. 1n 1996 , he was
aITested again and charged with subversion and seditious offences.
Wang had written about th
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subversion and sedition under the Chinese Criminal Laws. He was
subsequently sentenced to ten years of imprisonment. 1n April 1998 ,
Wang was released on medical parole and exiled to the USA; andthis was
possible mainly due to the diplomatic pressure of the US govemment, in
23
particular after the visit of President Bill Clinton to China. For Hong
Kong people , Wang Dang 's case was only one of the many that totally
ignored human rights in the PRC. The Iegislation of the Article 23
aroused the worries that the arbitrary use of the criminal Iaws and
procedures could be transplanted to Hong Kong and would lead to
subsequent loss of citizen rights enjoyed before the Handover.
The Standpoints of Different Political/Social Groups

The Democratic Pω'ty
Once the most in f1 uential political party in Hong Kong , The
Democratic Party (DP) did not oppose the legislation itself but argued
that sufficient preparation should be made before legislation and that the
provisions should not run in counter to the 1ntemational Covenant for
Political and Social Rights. Legislator Cheung Man-kwong suggested that
the best option was not to legislate the Article as Hong Kong already has
similar laws in dealing with treason , public order and intemal turmoi l.
Furthermore , Martin Lee , then chairman of the DP, argued that since the
promulgation of the Basic Law, the political situation has been stable , the
transition and the Handover has been smooth , and there are no political
groups which oppose unification and national territorial integrity,
therefore it is unnecessary to legislate the anti-subversion law, a move
that would certainly divide Hong Kong society. He further argued that the
DP fully supp 0l1s ‘ one China' policy and the reunification ofTaiwan. The
Falun Gong members have been peaceful demonstrators in Hong Kong.
He urged the Hong Kong SAR government to explain the situation to the
leaders in Beijing who may not have a full grasp of the information on
Hong Kong?4 Anthony Cheung Bing-leung , a former deputy chairman of
the Party and new chairman of SynergN 仗， a think tank , asserted that
there was no urgency to bring in the law and “ that any move to legislate
in the near future is bound to cause uncertainty in mainland-Hong Kong
relations .,, 25
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Democratic Alliance 101' Bettennent 01 Hong Kong (DAB) and Liberal
Party
The DAB was established in 1992 and Liberal Party in 1993.
Widely perceived as the ‘ indigenous CCP' , the DAB scored the biggest
electoral victory in the LegCo election in September 2004 and is now the
biggest political group in the LegCo , occupying 13 seats. Liberal Party
is the second biggest party in the LegCo , having 12 seats. Together, these
two paliies have a firm grip on the majority votes of the LegCo. Because
of that, Tsang Yok-sing and James Tien Pei-chun ,26 chairmen of both
parties were invited to join the Exco by Tung Chee-hwa in 2002 , when
the accountability system was introduced. lt goes without saying that the
two p aJiies have been staunch supporters of all govemment polices , in
patiicular on the legislation of Article of 23. After the 1 July mass
demonstrations , the DAB insisted that the Bill should go ahead as
scheduled to be enacted on 9 July 2003 , but the Liberal Party wavered
and finally James Tien resigned from the ExCo , meaning that the
govemment would not obtain sufficient votes in the LegCo and
consequently forcing Tung Chee-hwa to delay the legislation.

The Bar Association
Alan Leung Ka-kit , legislator and then chairman of the Bar
Association , even hinted at the possibility of a constitutional cnSlS , if
such legislation were forced through. Similar to Martin Lee , Leung
reiterated that the existing legislation could provide a set of legal code
that could deal with activities covered by the Document. On the other
hand , he argued that under the existing ordinances , the concept of
secession and subversion against the central goverηment is ambiguous at
bes t. The legislation borrows the concepts from Mainland China which
belongs to another legal system , thereby threatening the common law
notion of freedom and rights in Hong Kong. The Art icle , fUlihermore ,
violates the provisions of the lntemational Covenant of Political and
Social rights. ln future , it is likely that such legislation would be de c1 ared
unconstitutional in the court because the presumed ordinance would be
against the intemational covenant of social and political ri 的ts which is
27
contained in the Basic Law.

15

In July 2002 , the Bar Association published a repo此， outlining its
recommendations regarding the drafting of Article 23. Among the main
recommendations were the following. First, New legislation must
conform to Intemational Covenant on Civil and Political Ri ghts and other
relevant Basic Law provisions; Second , pure expression of opinion
should not be criminalized; Third , the Secretary of Justice's consent must
be obtained for prosecutions under Article 23; Fourth, on sedition , an
intention to incite violence or create public disorder against the
‘ constituted' authority has to be shown; Fifth , on treason , no objection to
amending the Crimes Ordinances to reflect the sovereignty change , but
only action involving or likely to lead to violence to be liable to
prosecution; Sixth , regarding the 缸 of state secrets , review Official Secrets
Ordinance to keep it in line with Johannesburg Principles on Restriction
on Freedom of Information; Seventh , on secession , in fact , actual
secessionist activity is covered under other laws , so there is no need for
the new legislation. 28

Article 23 Concern Group
This group rose to prominence during the consultatÌ on process and
consisted mostly senior counsels including Denis Chang , Audrey Eu,
A1an Leon 皂 ， Ronny Tony and legislator Margaret Ng. The group had"
estab1ished a website devoted to the discussion ofthe proposed legislation.
On the proposed legis1ation , the group submitted more than a hundred
revisions. After the SAR govemment submitted the legislation as the Blue
Bill , the group published a booklet summarizing their criticism. 29 The
group celiainly had wide spread influence on Hong Kong pub1ic , as they
were all legal experts with high credibility.

Other Social/ Religious Groups
Michael Davis , a human rights and constÌ tutional law specialist, was
concemed that "there have been intense meeting (between Hong Kong
officials and mainland officials) in which mainland officials are
interfering with enactment of this legislation... .perhaps we are consulting
too much on the content of this. ,, 30
Johannes Chan Man-mun , Hong
Kong University law dean , argued that the existing laws to hand1e
national security issues were enough. 31
He a1so argued that since Elsie
16

Leung had said that the legislation would mostly be based on existing
legislations , therefore , it was necessary to publish a11 the relevant
information in order to alleviate the uncertainties of the people. 32
The Hong Kong Human Rights Monitor group led by Mr Law
Yuk-k缸 in fact , sternly opposed such enactment. Law argued that the
incumbent legislation already provided sufficient basis for violent
activities against the Hong Kong SAR governmen t. F or instance , the
Crime Ordinances could prosecute those who instigate such activities
against the governmen t. For the theft of state secrets , he argued that the
Official Secrets Ordinances again was capable of dealing with the theft of
official secrets. Most importantly, the legislation practically abrogated the
provisions of freedom of speech and assembly which are guaranteed by
the Basic Law; Arti cI e 27 would be meaningless.33
Archbishop Joseph Zen Ze-Kiun was totally against the legislation.
He called on Catholics to join the 1 July demonstration (2003) to express
their dissatisfaction over the proposed legislation. He strongly urged the
government to defer the legislation and he believed that ifthe government
could accept to defer the legislation , the size of demonstration would be
4
reduced by hale However, Elsie Tu , the colonial fighter before the
Handover, argued that Bishop Zen's accusations were "groundless" and
based his judgments on the experiences of the days of the Cultural
Revolution. She believed that national security bill was necessary in
Hong Kong , as part of China , and the proposed bill , in fact , was more
liberal than the security law ofWestern democracies. 35 .

Foreign

00νernmen 肘 ，

Consulates and Press

Besides the public and the local press , foreign governments , Hong
Kong- based consul generals , and the foreign press had also expressed
concern over the issues relating to the legislation of the Article. Most of
them were \vorried that the freedom of speech , expression and the free
flow of information would be impacted by the implementation of the
Article 23 . Subsequently, Hong Kong would become less attractive to the
international community, and its status as an international commercial
and financial center would also be affected. The US and UK consulates in
Hong Kong ,36 the British Chamber of Commerce/ 7 and some foreign
banks also a11iculated the similar worries .38 The European Union issued a
statement , expressing the same worries and the European Parliament
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debated the issue in mid-December 2002. On 30 June 2003 , Bill Rammell ,
the British Foreign Office minister for Hong Kong , warned of the
proscription of organizations which “ blur the line between two
autonomous legal systems by introducing into Hong Kong legislation
linkages to mainland law. ,, 39 The editorial of New York Times stated that
"Freedom of speech could be threatened by a law that would ban
seditious publications.. .undermine the teITitory 's ability to survive as a
vibrant financial center that thrives on a free flow of information" , and
that " . ..the violation of Hong Kong's autonomy would devalue Beijing's
credibility in seeking a peaceful reconciliation with Taiwan. "的
Li K wok Po , a local banker and legislator for the banking sector,
reflected the sentiments of the banking industry. “ Banking in Hong Kong
would be a在ected if press freedom is restrained.. .if the media cannot
fully and fearlessly reflect news and views truthfully, the information is
useless--press freedom is what gives us a comparative advantage over
Sin gapore竹 片 l

Erosion of the high autonomy of Hong Kong was another worry for
the Western industrialized countries. According to the Article 2 of the
Basic Law, the HKSAR enjoys a high degree of autonomy, however, the
British Consulate General of Hong Kong 42, the Asian 防'a ll Street
44
43
Jo叫“nal and the Bar Association in England and Wales all showed
concern about the proposed provisions about banning organizations in
Hong Kong affiliated with Mainland organizations which are proscribed
in the Mainland on national security grounds. A press release by the
British Consulate-General in Hong Kong on 18 November 2002 said ,“It
is important that the integrity and independence of Hong Kong 's legal
system, key factors in Hong Kong's success are not compromised by the
proposed legislation".45
The lack of transparency, the hasty legislation schedule and the
refusal to publish the White Bill were other criticisms by the international
community. The US State Department had urged the SAR government to
release the exact draft of the proposed legislation of Art icle 23 for public
consultation. Philip Reeker, deputy spokesman of the US State
Departme肘， said that , “ We believe there should be an opportunity for the
fullest possible consultation on the draft legislation... " .46 1n the press
release of the British Consulate-General of Hong Kong , it also stated that
the British govemment w
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banks , especially banks from US , UK , Germany and France , told me they
hoped the Hong Kong Govemment would publish a white [bill] first"干
The extra-territorial effect of certain provisions in the proposed
legislation intensified the debate . The New Zealand government
expressed great concern over this issue. Phil Goff, the minister of
foreign affairs and trade , questioned the impact that the proposed
anti-subversion laws may have on foreign nationals living in Hong Kong
He said “ New Zealand will follow with interest how that proceeds and
how that may impact upon a New Zealander who , for example , may make
a comment in New Zealand that could come within this category.,, 49 The
50
51
US State Department , the British Consulate-General in Hong Kong
and the New 泊rk Times 52 also expressed the same view.
Dr. Frances D'Souza, a human rights expe此， who helped to dra丘 the
Johannesburg Principle 53 in 1995 , urged the SAR govemment to adopt a
strict definition of national security and ensure non-violent advocacy and
even insults to the govemment not be curtailed. On the issue of
“ subversion" , she said that “ The crime of subversion is new to the world.
1 don't know of any modem jurisprudence which would carry such serve
penalties for citizen who may unknowingly commit it.,, 54 She thought
that the anti-subversion legislation under Article 23 would be a major
blow to freedom and democratic development in Hong Kong.
Last but - not least, the proposed legislation had attracted public
attention in other countries. A group of US citizens had written a public
letter to the US president , urging him to follow closely the issues about
Article 23 , and make sure that the human rights in Hong Kong would not
be compromised. 55 Another group of foreign and local scholars had
written a public letter to the President of the PRC as well , asking him to
stop the legislation of Article 23 in Hong Kong. 56 The Asian Wall Street
Journal published an article titled "Broken Promise in Hong Kong" , in
which the writer argued Beijing was only concemed with the laws
about national security such as “ treason" and “ subversion" ; however,
Tung Chee-hwa 's govemment "went on extra mile"切， trying to suppress
the freedom of press and expression as wel l.
The Escalation of the Debate
The Document was heavily criticized by the legal community and
social groups. Brushing aside opposition voices , the govemment gazetted
19

the National Security Bill on 11 February 2003 and submitted the
proposed legislation to the LegCo for first and second reading. The public
demanded a White Bill (full draft of the legislation) be published for
more thorough consultation. The Article 23 Concem Group suggested
more than one hundred amendments to the Bill on 13 June 2003. 58 On 14
June 2003 , when nearly all the legislators of pan-democratic camp
attended a forum on the Art icle 23 , held in the Hong Kong University, the
pro-Beijing legislators passed the original Bill without amendment and
the govemment made ready to be submitted to the LegCo on 9 July 2003
for the final enactment. The move angered the public and the mood of
confrontation intensified.
As soon as the SAR govemment published the Document a powerful
political group was formed , named Civil Human Rights Front (CHRF) ,
comprising f01iy plus social and political groups conceming different
religious , labour, cultural ， εlass root issues. The CHRF specially set up a
Article 23 working committee to deal with issues ansmg from the
legislation of the Art icle 23. The CHRF organized a 60 ,000 people
demonstration opposing Article 23 legislation on 15 December 2002 at
the end of the three-month consultation period. Moreover, it organized a
candle night, participated by 1,500 people , when the National Security
Bill went to LegCo for first reading on 25 Feb. 2003. Finally, the CHRF
became the most powerful group that organized the world-stunning half
million July 1st mass peaceful demonstration against the SAR
govemment. 59
A group of local scholars reanalyzed the submissions to the
government at the end of the 3-month period. They found a total of
369 ,374 individuals had expressed their opinion on the Document and of
these 34.6% supported the proposed legislation content, while 62.6%
opposed. F or those who opposed , the most 0 丘en-cited reason was that it
would hurt human rights and freedom and followed by that reason that it
would damage one country, two systems and so on. 60 Beginning in early
2003 , the political atmosphere began to be more tense and society
increasingly polarized. Different groups galvanized forces for suppo此
As the sixth anniversary of the establishment of the Hong Kong SAR
approached, the democratic camp agreed to stage a mass rally to oppose
the Bill, although people thought that the chance for the government to
back-down was slim. Throughout June 2003 , people had be
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mass media also played a role but none was more active in mobilizing
than the Apple Dai紗， which practically abandoned the language of
neutrality and urged people to take part in the demonstration on 1 July
2003 .
In the end , more than half a million people tU l11 ed up on the streets on
The number of
1 July 2003 to protest against the legislation.
demonstrators exceeded the wildest expectations of the organizers. Some
even estimated the people were more than a mi l1 ion. Certainly, this was
the biggest rally in Hong Kong since 1989. More embarrassingly for the
SAR gove l11 ment was that Wen Jiabao , the Chinese premier, was in Hong
Kong to celebrate the sixth anniversary of the establishment of Hong
Kong SAR. He departed for Shenzhen in the mO l11 ing on 1 July. It was
reported that he watched the drama unfolded and was surprised to find so
many people tumed up to oppose the SAR gove l11 men t. 61
1n the wake of the massive protest, Tung held a crisis meeting with
his cabinet the next day and decided to go ahead as planned to submit the
National Security Bi l1 to the LegCo on 9 July 2003 , while promising to
amend three of the most controversial areas including the removal of
proscription mechanism, the addition of public interest defence , and to
withdraw the police power in investigative entry without judicial warrant
on 5 July 2003. However, despite the insistence of the govemment , the
lawmakers began to waver as public pressure was mounting. Dr Lo
Wing-Iok, representing the medical sector, said that he was waiting for
the results of a questionnaire which he sent to a l1 10 ,000 doctors in the
territories , and said , “ 1 will vote according to the majority view of
respondents. 1 wi l1 also take into consideration the very loud voice in
yesterday 's march." James Tien Pei-chun, the Liberal Party chief which
had been the goverτunent 's staunch suppo口 er， now said that the Party's
eight LegCo members vote would depend on how the government
62
responded to the public demand. Moreover, activists wa l11 ed that they
would besiege the LegCo building if its plan of enactment were
unchanged and even wamed that there might be clashes between the
supporters of the gove l11 ment and the opponents on 9 July outside the
LegCo chamber in central
Dramatically, coming back from Beijing, James Tien claimed that ,
after consultation with senior officials there , he was told that Beij ing had
110 timetable for the National Security Bil l.
Tien then publicly on 4 July
a
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proposing to make three amendments on the Bill as above. Apparently,
Tien was not satisfied with the move and he declared he would resign
from the ExCo on 6 July. The ‘ ruling coalition' formed in July 2002
immediately crumbled and the SAR government became a minority
without the support of the Liberal Party in the LegCo. Tung was forced to
de c1 are the deferment of the final reading of the Bill.
The Civil Human Rights Front organized two more mass rallies in
the Central on 9 July and 13 July, attended by thousands of people.
Gradually, the slogans of the ra11ies shifted to ask the govemment to
introduce direct elections both on the Chief Executive in 2007 and a11
LegCo members in 2008. The momentum towards universal
democratization was so great that the SAR govemment was not able to
resist it and subsequently led to the intervention of Beijing on Hong
Kong's internal affairs by re-interpretating the Basic Law on the relevant
provisions 63 in April 2004.
On 16 J uly 2003 , Regina Ip , Secretary of Security, resigned from her
post for personal reasons , but apparently for her failure in her bid to
implement article 23. On the same day, Anthony Leung Kam-chung , the
Financial Secretary, tendered his resignation letter for an a l1 eged
con f1 ict of interes t. The fiasco of the Bill caused Tung's popularity rating
to dip to its lowest point since 1997. In a survey conducted by Hong
Kong University between 14-16 July, 63% of the respondents were
against his performance and 72% were against him to be the CE. 64 In
retrospect , 1 July 2003 mass demonstration was the turning point for
Hong Kong as well as for Tung. It marked the beginning of the end of an
era of relatively non-interference policy by Beijing and practically the
end of Tung's political career. Tung resigned from the CE post in March
2005. The political struggles between the SAR govemment and
pan-democratic camp and other NGOs in the legislation process of Article
23 engendered a “ new breed of heroes" as the SCMP titled one of its
reports.的

Conclusion
The political struggles between the pro-one-country camp and the
pro-two systems camp on the legislation of Arti c1 e 23 crystalized the
conflicts arising from the integration of two regions with two entirely
different legal traditions , political histories , cultural dimensions and mass
22

psychological experiences. For several decades , Hong Kong was kept
from the political turmoil and intrigues of Chinese mainland. Having
escaped from mainland, Hong Kong people coulddo what they wanted in
daily life under the British rule. Hong Kong had an independent judiciary
and the colonial rule was benign. Political participation was not the goal
of daily life until the advent of the 1997 issue. Hong Kong was a
capitalist paradise where there was no bar on the way to success if one
works hard enough.
Since the 1980s , democratization has become one of the most
imp Oliant goals that the community strives for. 1n the 1990s , because of
Governor Chris Pattern's political reform (1 992-1997) , the era of party
politics dawned. The tragedy is that the pace of regression has been
forced upon by a centralized power center in Beijing. The legislation of
Article 23 displays the tactics of ‘Leninist integration' by the CCP. The
super-paradox theorists were too naïve politically. They were
well-intentioned people , having hopes in the PRC government. As one of
the advocates Elsie Tu said ,“ Since the [Cultural Revolution] when a
quiet and peaceful revolution has made China one of the most
enlightened governments in the world." They were oblivious to the
changes after the Handover. For example , in 1998 , the introduction of the
mother-tongue as the medium of instruction in the secondary schools
aroused strong social resistance , which was against the tradition of
leaving the secondary schools to choose their own medium of instruction
No sooner did the policy begin ~q be implemented , than the SAR
govemment had to back down. 67 /ßn 1999 , the abolition of the two
mmiciw / Coumls anther cemalihd political power in the executive
branch- y pb l999 巾的市etation by the NPC deprived the jurisdiction
power o'fthe Court of Final Appeal , putting the NPC as the final arbitrator
in leεal litigation and able to intervene as it wished. Finally, the
introduction of the principal official accountability systein in 2002 ,
enhanced the CE 's power enormously. Contrary to what the
super-paradox theories wished to see , the post-Handover has seen the
incremental absorption of HK into the PRC of Leninist leanings. For
many people , the vivid imagery of the tanks crushing tents of students
and the statue of liberty in (the Tiannamen Square) stiU lingers. Despite
the achievements of the legal system in the past two decades ,68 China 's
concept of rule of law i

“

,
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policy goals. Patiicularly where political prerogatives are at stake , legal
requirements appear to pose little restraint on state power."的
The legislation of Art icle 23 certainly would change the nature of
Hong Kong legal system. Fortunately, Tung totally failed and on 5
September 2003 , he withdrew the Bill and without committing to a time
table. ln September 2004 , after the LegCo elections on 10 September,
Tung once again declared he had no intention of submitting the Bill to the
7o
LegCo and no timetable was scheduled. Tung has had to pay a heavy
71
political price in sixteen months. The democrats seem to have won a
big battle over Article 23 , but without realizing that they have lost the war
on “ double universal elections" for 2007-08.
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